In this paper, we propose a modular and fully decentralized protocol to orchestrate fair exchanges between mutually distrustful yet collaborating web services. Our motivation roots in the observation that fair exchange is a key problem in settings where mutually distrustful entities are willing to exchange critical digital items in the absence of a trusted third party, which is typically the case of web services collaborating on a peer-to-peer basis. Examples of such scenarios include multiparty exchanges of security information (e.g., cryptographic keys), multiparty sharing of digital rights (e.g., to display some digital content), digital contract signing, etc. Our fair exchange orchestration protocol is based on two key building blocks, namely a tamperproof secure box and a module solving the well-known Byzantine agreement problem. The tamperproof secure boxes need not communicate directly with each other and are only required in a limited number of key steps of our algorithm. Our approach has the advantage to allow fair exchanges to complete even though truly malicious participants have aborted.
FAIR EXCHANGE & WEB SERVICES
The Internet has changed the way we do business in many ways. Yet most successful e-business solutions today are following a classical client/server architecture (centralized). Going back to the roots of the Internet, this implies that current e-business solutions somehow fail to take full advantage of the Internet's underlying protocols, which were designed to support fully decentralized approaches.
1 For example, current e-business solutions do not provide a favorable environment for electronic exchanges in the absence of some centralized and trusted server, i.e., they fail to support peer-to-peer only settings. However, two main factors are urging us to reconsider the current e-business architectures: the advent of a more participative web, sometimes dubbed as Web 2.0 [28] , and the emergence of ubiquitous and mobile services, which often have to operate in a disconnected manner with respect to the Internet.
In this paper, we advocate that fair exchange ought to be a critical building block of any middleware or toolkit aimed at orchestrating peer-to-peer collaboration between mutually distrustful web services. Furthermore, we propose a modular and fully decentralized solution that does not require the presence of a trusted third party. Our motivation roots in the observation that fair exchange is useful both at the system level (to build higher-level services) and at the application level (to provide end-user functionality). For example, fair exchange plays critical role when it comes to exchange critical information, e.g., cryptographic keys, between multiple web services. This is a typical system-level task that might participate in the realization of a data transfer service between multiple systems but does not require the explicit participation of end-users. Coordinating the signature of a digital contract between multiple services, on the other hand, is clearly an application-level task. In a somewhat hybrid scenario, fair exchange guarantees might also be useful when transferring digital rights between multiple devices in a digital home network.
2 Yet another application of fair exchange can be found in payment systems promoting fairness and anonymity via mix networks [33] .
Trust, a key enabler
In our modern daily lives, the notions of fair exchange and trust are ubiquitous: everyday, without even noticing, we participate in numerous commercial exchanges, which we expect to be fair (and most actually are). A key enabler to make all these exchanges occur is the notion of trust. In the physical world, this trust is supported by the identification and the implicit reputation of tangible exchange partners. In the digital world, on the contrary, fair exchange is a surprisingly difficult problem. This can be explained by the lack of trust that characterizes the digital realm. Yet, fair exchange is a fundamental problem that has been constantly studied over the past decades and that has lately regained interest [4, 5, 6, 19] . When it comes to solve fair exchange in semi-open environments, where parties are not necessarily known and trusted a priori, carefully modeling and analyzing trust relationships between peers is a central issue. Consequently, the notion of trust is at the heart of our modular solution.
Towards a minimal and modular solution
The fair exchange problem consists in a group of processes, 3 each possessing a digital item, that want to exchange these items. A fair exchange protocol must then ensure that if one process obtains its desired item, all other processes also obtain their desired items. As suggested earlier, solving fair exchange in the total absence of trust is problematic and was even proved to be impossible in several contexts [15, 19, 29] . For this reason, our solution relies on a set of trusted modules, one per peer participating in the exchange. Note that this feature does not remove all the complexity of the problem since trusted modules communicate through untrusted channels. From a practical perspective, a trusted module is typically implemented as a tamperproof piece of hardware embedded in each peer host, e.g., a specialized chip or a smart card. In the industry, this hardware-based approach is gaining momentum, as illustrated by efforts from IBM, with both its PCI 4758 and PCI-X 4764 cryptographic coprocessors [14] , and from Intel, with its Trusted Platform Module [7] . This approach is expected to become mainstream, as the urge to go beyond the limits of software-based security increases, in particular in the realm of digital rights management.
Despite the fact that some of these specialized chips can be quite powerful, our approach tries to minimize the requirements on the conceptual trusted modules we consider, in order to facilitate the fulfillment of those requirements by current and future chips. Indeed, a fair exchange protocol should make minimal assumptions on the underlying hardware if it wants to support a wide range of platforms. Another important goal of our approach consists in providing a modular solution to fair exchange, where each element of the solution can easily be replaced by an alternative implementation.
Contribution and roadmap
Section 2 proposes a specification of the fair exchange problem that clearly separates liveness and safety, whereas most specifications in the literature tend to mix these two properties, in particular when capturing the very notion of fairness. This section also introduces our system model, which categories processes as either participants, which might be Byzantine, or trustees, which are known a priori to be correct. The latter category captures the notion of trusted module. We also recall an impossibility result from a companion paper [19] , which states a necessary conditions for the solvability of fair exchange in a model with trustees. Section 3 details our second and main contribution: a modular solution to the fair exchange problem relying on two building blocks: a set of secure boxes, which play the role of trustees, and a module solving the well-known Byzantine agreement problem. Section 3.4 then discusses various aspects of our solution and proposes a time and communication complexity analysis of our algorithm, while Section 4 discusses researches that relate to ours. Finally, Section 5 places our results into perspective and discusses ongoing and future work.
FAIR EXCHANGE & TRUST
We consider a distributed system consisting of a set Π of n processes, Π = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}. Processes of Π are called participants. We complete our model with a set Π of n trusted processes, Π = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }, i.e., a trusted process is known to be correct a priori by all other processes. Processes of Π are called trustees and are used to model the tamperproof hardware modules mentioned earlier. As a consequence, each p i is matched in a one-to-one relationship with the corresponding participant pi and is directly connected to it. The set Π + is then the set of all 2n processes, i.e., Π + = Π ∪ Π . Participants are processes actually taking part in the exchange by offering and demanding items, and they may exhibit Byzantine behaviors. Trustees on the contrary are trusted processes that have no direct interest in the exchange. Their role to decide when it is appropriate to provide their associated participant with its desired item. We also assume the existence of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), i.e., each process (participants and trustees) owns a private key and made the corresponding public key accessible to all other processes. Among other things, this assumption provides message unforgeability.
Topology and synchrony
Processes are interconnected by a communication network and communicate by message passing. The system is synchronous: it exhibits synchronous computation and synchronous communication, i.e, there exists upper bounds on processing and communication delays. To help our reasoning, we also assume the existence of some global real time clock, whose tick range, noted T , is the set of natural numbers.
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For the network topology, we assume that all processes of Π are fully interconnected, whereas trustees are only connected to their respective processes. Figure 1 illustrates such a topology with five participant processes and their respective trustees. Links are reliable bidirectional communication channels, i.e, if both the sender and the receiver are correct, any message inserted in the channel is eventually delivered by the receiver. The synchronous system assumption further tells us that the delivery will occur within some known time bound. Formally, channels are said to be perfect links (PL), which provide send and deliver primitives (respectively PL.send() and PL.deliver()) and ensure the well-known termination and no creation properties. 
Executions and failure patterns
We define the execution of algorithm A as a sequence of steps executed by processes of Π. In each step, a process has the opportunity to atomically perform all three following actions: (1) send a message, (2) receive a message and (3) update its local state.
5 Based on this definition, a Byzantine process is one that deviates from A in any sort of way, so a Byzantine process is Byzantine against a specific algorithm A. It is a known result that Byzantine failures can only be defined with respect to some algorithm [13] . A Byzantine failure pattern f is then defined as a function of T to 2 Π where f (t) denotes a set of Byzantine processes that have deviated from A through time t. In a way, a failure pattern f can be seen as a projection of all process failures during some execution of A. Once a process starts misbehaving, it cannot return to being considered correct, i.e., f (t) ⊆ f (t + 1). We also define F as the set of all possible failure patterns of A, so f ∈ F . Let Byz(f ) = S t∈T f (t) and Cor(f ) = Π − Byz(f ) denote respectively the set of Byzantine processes in f and the set of correct processes in f . We define the set F b of all failure patterns where no more than b processes are Byzantine. More formally, F b is the largest subset of F such that, for any failure pattern f ∈ F b , |Byz(f )| ≤ b, with 0 ≤ b ≤ n:
Note that b is bounded by n, the number of processes in Π. From this definition, b is the maximum number of Byzantine processes in any failure pattern of F b and Fn = F . Note that all the above definitions regarding executions and failures are similar to the models of [10, 13] , but that failures refer exclusively to participants, i.e., processes of Π, since trustees are correct.
The fair exchange problem
The fair exchange problem consists in a group of processes trying to exchange digital items in a fair manner. The difficulty of the problem resides in achieving fairness. Intuitively, fairness means that, if one process obtains the desired digital item, then all processes involved in the exchange should also obtain their desired digital item. The assumption is made that each process knows both the set Π of processes participating in the fair exchange and the terms of the exchange. The terms of the exchange are defined by a set D of expected item descriptions, D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn}, and a set Ω of pairs of processes (pi, pj). A description di is the description of the item expected by process pi. Furthermore di is unique, so if i = j, then di = dj. A pair (pi, pj) defines the receiver pj of the item offered by pi. Elements of Ω are defined such that pj is the image of pi through a bijective map (or permutation) of Π, with i = j. Finally, let M denote the set of digital items mi actually offered by process pi during an execution of fair exchange, M = {m1, m2, . . . , mn}. Note that for each description in D there does not necessarily exist a corresponding item in M , since M might include items offered by Byzantine processes.
Fair exchange as a service
Fair exchange can be seen as a service allowing processes to exchange digital items in a fair manner. Each process offers an item in exchange for a counterpart of which it has the description. The exchange is concluded when every process releases the desired counterpart or the abort item ϕ, meaning that the exchange has aborted. To achieve this, the service offers the two primitives described below.
offer(mi, pj) -Enables the process pi to initiate its participation in the exchange with processes of Π by offering item mi to pj, in exchange for the item matching description di, with di and Π known a priori. release(x) -Informs the process that the exchange completed and works as a callback. Process pi receives item x, which is either the item matching di or the abort item ϕ.
Note that, at the end of an exchange, we say that pi releases an item, meaning that the service calls back the release operation of pi. This convention is similar to the one used for classical deliver primitives, e.g., in reliable broadcast primitives [21] .
Fair exchange properties
We now specify the formal properties of the fair exchange problem. While several other specifications exist in the literature [5, 6, 29] , our specification differs in that it separates safety and liveness via fine-grained properties. Such elemental properties then allow us to better reason about the correctness of our solution.
Validity. If a correct process pi releases an item x, then either x ∈ M and x matches di, or x is the abort item ϕ.
Uniqueness. No correct process releases more than once.
Non-triviality. If all processes are correct, no process releases the abort item ϕ.
Termination. Every correct process eventually releases an item.
Integrity. No process pj releases an item mi, with process pi correct, if mi matches description d k of some correct process p k , with p k = pj.
Fairness. If any process pi releases an item mj matching description di, with pi or pj correct, then every correct process p k releases an item matching description d k .
Among these six properties, the last two, integrity and fairness, are specific to the problem of fair exchange and define precisely the possible outcomes of fair exchange algorithms.
Other specifications of fair exchange usually rely on a single property to capture the notion of fairness [2, 5, 29] . However we argue that if those specifications are suitable for cases where n = 2, they are impossible to satisfy in models allowing more than one Byzantine process. In [5] , for example, the fairness property requires that if any correct process does not obtain its item, then no process obtains any items from any other process. This is clearly unsustainable in the presence of two or more Byzantine processes because one cannot prevent two Byzantine processes from conspiring in order for one of them to obtain the item of the second one. A simple but flawed fix would be to modify the definition as follows: if any correct process does not obtain its item, then no process obtains any items from any correct process.
If it first seems correct, this definition of fairness now allows a correct process to obtain the item of a Byzantine process, even if other correct processes do not obtain anything.
Coming back to our specification, integrity ensures that no process obtains an item offered by some other correct process and matching the description of a correct process. Notice that this does not prevent a Byzantine process from illicitly obtaining the item destined to or offered by some other Byzantine process, since such a behavior cannot be prevented and does not prejudice any correct process. Then, fairness guarantees that if any process obtains its desired item offered by some other process, with at least one of them being correct, then every correct process also obtains its desired item. In other words this property prevents a Byzantine process from taking advantage of a correct process but does not protect other Byzantine processes. More trivially, it also ensures that no correct process takes advantage of any process.
Impossibility result
In a companion paper [19] , we show that a necessary condition for solving fair exchange in the model with trustees is to have every correct participant reliably connected to a majority of trustees. Hereafter, Theorem 1 gives an informal reading of this condition. In order to present it, we must first define the notion of reliable path. Let pi and pj be two correct processes of Π + . We say that pi and pj are connected by a reliable path, if there exists at least one path between pi and pj such that no process along that path is Byzantine. Furthermore, we define the reachable majority condition as the condition under which, for any correct process p ∈ Π and any failure pattern f ∈ F b , p is connected through a reliable path to a majority of trustees, i.e., n 2 +1 , even in the presence of up to b Byzantine processes. Theorem 1. In the context of a synchronous model with trustees and Byzantine failures, there is no deterministic solution to the fair exchange problem, if the reachable majority condition is not satisfied.
The formal version of Theorem 1 and its corresponding proof fall outside the scope of this paper and can be found in [19] . However, to intuitively understand what this theorem captures, first observe that, in order to ensure fairness, trustees must make a consistent decision whether to allow their respective processes to obtain their items or not. Then, from the assumed topology (recall Figure 1) , observe that if some correct process p is not reliably connected to a majority of trustees, neither is its trustee p . So, either p is not allowed to make a decision and we end up violating the termination property of fair exchange; or p is indeed allowed to make a decision in the absence of a majority, in which case we have no means to prevent fairness from being violated, e.g., if another group of reliably connected trustees make a contradictory decision.
Interestingly, the result of Theorem 1 is valid for any network topology that can be represented as a connected graph, i.e., where there exists a direct or indirect path between any two processes (trustees or participants). Nevertheless, in regard of the topology assumption of our model, the condition of Theorem 1 translates into a condition on the maximum number of Byzantine processes. Since each trustee is behind a distinct participant, which is potentially Byzantine, insolvability is avoided if and only if there is a honest majority, i.e., b < n 2
. Figure 1 shows an example of such a topology with five processes out of which three are Byzantine, i.e., n = 5 and b = 3. In this specific case, Theorem 1 tells us that there are no solution to the problem, since there is a correct process not connected reliably to a majority of trustees. In this topology, it is clear that this is due to the fact that b > n 2 .
A MODULAR SOLUTION
Our fair exchange protocol relies on two building blocks detailed hereafter, namely a Byzantine agreement module (BA) and a secure box module (SB), the latter playing the role of the trustee. 7 As suggested in Figure 2 , only the code of the secure box module is tamperproof. Furthermore, our solution aims at minimizing the intelligence required from the secure boxes. This module provides processes with a means to reliably broadcast messages, in spite of Byzantine failures. The BA module provides three primitives, BA.start(), BA.send() and BA.deliver(), described hereafter.
BA.start(pj)
For each execution of the protocol, every correct process calls the start primitive at the same time, see explanation below, and process pj then calls the send primitive.
BA.send(pi,m) -Enables a process pi to reliably broadcast a message m to all processes.
BA.deliver(pj ,S) -Works as a callback and enables a process pj to receive a set S of messages as the result of a reliable broadcast. Possible outcomes are: (1) S is a singleton, if the sender behaved correctly; (2) S contains more than one message, if the sender behaved incorrectly by sending different messages; (3) S is the empty set, if the sender did not send anything.
The goal is to prevent Byzantine processes from threatening agreement among correct processes and ensure the two following interactive consistency (IC) properties. When relying on unforgeable signed messages, a solution is known to exists for any number of Byzantine processes [24] .
IC1. If a correct process BA.delivers a set S of messages, then every correct process BA.delivers S.
IC2. If a correct process BA.sends a message m, then every correct process eventually BA.delivers the set {m}.
An implicit assumption in [24] is that all processes roughly start at the same time to allow the absence of messages to be detected. Since all correct processes start Algorithm 1 at the same time, the start primitive enables us to explicitly ensure this assumption by having all trustees calling the primitive at the same time. This ensures termination of BA, even if a trustee does not send any vote or messages are blocked by some Byzantine processes. Also, in a synchronous model, an essential requirement of the Byzantine agreement problem is that the delivery of a set of messages is achievable within a maximum time bound. Furthermore, in [12] , it is shown that deterministic Byzantine agreement protocols with authentication have a lower bound b + 1 on the number of rounds, with b the number of Byzantine processes. So, if we chose such an implementation of BA, this time bound can be computed as a function of the time bound of PL and the number of Byzantine processes, ΔBA = (b + 1) × ΔPL. In [16, 22] , solutions to the Byzantine agreement problem allow expected constant time bounds, i.e., not correlated with the number of Byzantine processes, with the assumption of an honest majority. However, if the honest majority assumption falls into the requirements of our model, these solutions do not achieve deterministic Byzantine agreement and are thus not sufficient for our needs.
Secure Box (SB)
A secure box module is a simple tamperproof device and corresponds to the notion of trustee of our general model. In this model, each trustee is only connected to its corresponding process, so when it needs to communicate with other trustees or processes, it relies completely on the process hosting it. For example, a Byzantine host (process) may thus isolate its trustee by blocking any incoming or outgoing information. In our solution, the role of the secure box is reduced as much as possible: it is completely passive and
One can see the secure box as an individual service available to each participant. Through the use of a public key infrastructure (PKI), its role is merely one of a safe. The SB device offers the following set of primitives.
SB.isValidItem(mj ,di) -Returns a boolean stating whether
the encrypted item mj matches description di. 
SB.sign(mi) -Returns a signed version of a message mi.
Signature is done using the private key of p i , i.e., the secure box of process pi.
SB.encrypt(mi,pj) -Returns an encrypted version of an item mi. Encryption is done using the public key of p j , i.e., the secure box of process pj.
Fair Exchange Algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents our solution to the fair exchange problem. For sake of simplicity, we assume that all correct processes have local clocks that are synchronized within some fixed maximum drift, as discussed in [30] , so they are able to start the algorithm roughly at the same time. We also assume that upon actions are executed atomically with respect to one another. Our algorithm is divided into three phases described hereafter: (1) item exchange, (2) voting and (3) clue exchange.
Item exchange. The first phase of the algorithm allows every process to send the item they are offering. Each process sends the item to one (and only one) other process (line 11), as defined in the terms of the exchange. The item has to be encrypted, since the receiving process must not be able to have direct access to it. The encryption is thus made using the public key of the secure module of the receiving process. The secure box acts as a safe, and it is only at the end of the protocol that the process finally has access to the item.
Voting. Once process pi receives the encrypted item, it asks its secure module to assert that the item matches the description and starts the voting phase. The process signs and broadcasts its proceed vote (line 17) using BA, indicating that it has received the expected item. It also start BG for each process in order to synchronize with all the other correct processes. Then, upon reception of a vote, the validProceedVote() function checks if the delivered set is a singleton containing the valid proceed vote of the sender (line 22). If the vote is valid, it is added to the set of votes. Once all votes are gathered, a process knows that every process has voted proceed and has thus received the correct item. With that information, process pi signs and sends the n votes -called the i-th clue -to every process (line 27). This is necessary to enter the final phase, which consist in having processes exchange their clues. Note that nothing prevents clues ← clues ∪ {clue} 34:
if (|clues| > n/2) then {checks for majority} 35:
released ← 'true' 36:
item ← SB.unseal(sealedItem, clues) 37:
release(item) {releases the unsealed item} some Byzantine process p k to produce its vote and its clue without having previously received its item. However such a behavior cannot prejudice any process other than p k .
Clue exchange. In this phase, process pi sends its clue to every process and waits to receive the clues from a majority of processes (line 34). Upon reception of a clue, the validClue() function checks if the clue contains a signed set of all n proceed votes (line 32). With n 2 + 1 clues, it asks its secure module to release the sealed item by deciphering it using its private key (line 36). The majority is necessary to ensure that at least one correct process was able to produce its i-th clue in order for any process to release its item. At this stage, correct processes should be able to release without the help of any Byzantine process; on the contrary, Byzantine processes should not be able to release without the help of at least one correct process. This aspect of our algorithm is further discussed in Section 3.4. Figure 3 presents four possible executions of Algorithm 1 with three processes and up to one Byzantine process. In all figures, the top line shows the time line with the different time bounds, the top labels corresponds to the correct behavior, the arrows show the message transmissions and the bottom labels (if any) give the Byzantine behavior of process p3. Figure 3(a) shows an execution where all processes are correct. In Figure 3(b) , process p3 is Byzantine and deviates from the correct behavior by failing to send the item expected by p1. So p1 does not send its vote and eventually every correct process releases the abort item ϕ. Yet p3 is not able to release its item. In Figure 3(c) , process p3 is Byzantine and deviates from the correct behavior by failing to send its vote or by sending it too late. So eventually every correct process release the abort item ϕ. Yet p3 is not able to release its item. In Figure 3(d) , process p3 is Byzantine and deviates from the correct behavior by failing to send its clue. However, in this case, all the correct processes are still able to release their items.
Examples of executions

Correctness proof
In the following, we prove that Algorithm 1 solves fair exchange in the presence of b Byzantine processes, with b < n 2 . Our correctness proof aims at showing that Algorithm 1 preserves the Validity, Uniqueness, Non-triviality, Termination, Integrity and Fairness properties of fair exchange. Based on Lemma 1, the respective theorems hereafter validate each of these properties. The notation p i describing a trustee or a secure box is equivalent to SB used in Algorithm 1. Lemma 1. If some correct process pj does not receive an encrypted item matching description dj , then no process releases at line 37 of Algorithm 1.
Proof. If some correct process pj does not receive its expected item, it does not send a proceed vote. So no process obtains the proceed vote from pj. Since no process receives all n proceed votes and a clue is composed of a signed set of n proceed votes, no process produces its clue. From the no creation property of perfect links, no process receives any clue. Without a majority of clues, no process releases the item at line 37.
Theorem 2. If a correct process pi releases an item x, then either x ∈ M and x matches di, or x is the abort item ϕ.
Proof. A correct process pi explicitly releases the abort item ϕ at line 30, and the only other case of release is at line 37. In the latter, pi releases the item that is stored in variable sealedItem. From Lemma 1, if pi releases at line 37, it has previously received an item matching di and stored it in variable sealedItem. From the no creation property of perfect links, that item was sent and offered by some process of Π. Since, from line 13, no subsequently received items can be stored in sealedItem, at line 37, pi releases an item that belongs to M and matches di.
Theorem 3. No correct process releases more than once. Proof. The boolean variable released and the atomic execution assumption prevent any correct process from releasing more than once. Proof. Since every process is correct, every process sends the correct encrypted item at line 11 as agreed in the terms of the exchange. From the eventual delivery property of PL, every process pi receives an item matching description di before time t1 = t0 + ΔPL, so every process produces and sends its proceed vote at line 17 in a timely fashion. From the IC2 property of BA, no process receives an invalid proceed vote. So finally, no process releases the abort item ϕ (line 30).
Theorem 5. Every correct process eventually releases an item.
Proof. The time-out at line 18 ensures that every correct process starts all n executions of BA at the same time. This implies that, from the existence of a time bound for the termination of BA and the IC1 property of BA, there is a time after which, either every correct process receives at least one invalid proceed vote and releases the abort item ϕ, or every correct process receives all n valid proceed votes. In the latter case, every correct process then produces and sends its i-th clue at line 27. From the eventual delivery property of PL and the honest majority condition, every correct process receives a majority of clues and then releases at line 37. Proof. Only in a single step of Algorithm 1, i.e., at line 11, does a correct process pi transmit its item mi through the network. Since pi is correct, pi encrypts mi using the key of p k in order to send it through the network. So no process other than pi and p k holds a deciphered version of mi and, since pi and p k are correct, they do not send a deciphered version of mi to pj. From assumption on the PKI unforgeability, pj is not capable of obtaining a deciphered version of mi. So pj does not release mi.
Theorem 7. If any process pi releases an item mj matching description di, with pi or pj correct, then every correct process p k releases an item matching description d k .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that some correct process p k does not release an item matching description d k and that some other process pi releases an item mj matching description di, with pi or pj correct. If pi releases mj (line 37), from assumption on SB, either pi is correct and needs a majority of clues in order to release mj; or pj is correct and encrypted mj before sending it to pi (lines 10 and 11) and thus pi needs a majority of clues in order to release mj. So in either cases, if pi releases mj, pi receives a majority of clues in some previous steps. From the honest majority condition, at least one of these clues is produced by some correct process px. Process px thus receives all n proceed votes. So, from the IC1 property of BA, every correct process receives all n proceed votes. So finally, no correct process releases the abort item ϕ (line 30), including p k . From the Validity and Termination properties of FE, if p k does not release the abort item ϕ, then p k releases an item matching description d k . A contradiction.
Discussions
Unfair to Byzantine processes?
Without gaining any advantage over correct processes, a Byzantine process may systematically have all processes abort the exchange. However, this is only the case in the early stages of our algorithm, during the transmission of the items or during the voting phase. Once the vote has been successfully completed, correct processes execute the remainder of the protocol without depending on the behavior of any Byzantine process. In other words, correct processes may complete the exchange possibly at the expense of Byzantine processes. So the question is: are we being unfair to Byzantine processes? The answer is twofold.
Consider the case where a Byzantine process is truly malicious, in the sense that, behind that process, there is a malevolent mind purposefully trying to abuse the system. In that case, one can argue that the abuser is responsible of his own fate. Even more so, since, if the correct processes are able to obtain their item, there is nothing preventing a malicious process from successfully receiving its item, even if it tried to corrupt the system, as illustrated in Figure 3(d) .
Consider then the case where a Byzantine process is merely malfunctioning, i.e., without any malicious intention. For example, in the case of crash, a failing process might not be responsible for the occurrence of the failure, so unfairness would then arguably prejudice an otherwise correctly behaving process. This problem can be solved by assuming a crash-recovery model, fair lossy links [1] (instead of perfect links) and some local persistent storage available to each process. 9 With fair lossy links, indeed, if the fair exchange protocol successfully reaches the key exchange phase, a good process 10 would eventually receive a majority of keys, and thus be able to release its item. On the other hand, the use of fair lossy links does not prevent an unfair outcome for a process that definitely crashes. But in case of such a catastrophic event, one can argue that unfairness is less of an issue, since the digital item is lost anyway.
Complexity Analysis
The performance of our solution is directly dependent on the performance of the underlying modules used in Algorithm 1 and in particular on that of the BA module. If BA reaches a decision in s communication steps, Algorithm 1 needs s + 2 communications steps to reach termination. In [11] , it was shown that the lower bound for deterministic BA is b + 1. This result provides us with a best possible performance of b + 3 communications steps for Algorithm 1, with b Byzantine processes. So in the worst case scenario, termination is reached in n 2 + 2 communication steps. Regarding the number of messages, the cost analysis may be done for both a broadcast network, in which a broad-cast needs one message, and for a point-to-point network, in which a broadcast needs n − 1 messages. In either cases, the performance of Algorithm 1 in terms of number of messages depends on the number of messages σ needed in BA. In a broadcast network, our solution needs 2n + σ to reach termination. In a point-to-point network, our solution needs n 2 + σ to reach termination. Results in [11] show that, for a point-to-point network, the lower bound on the number of message to reach agreement in BA is O(nb). So the message cost for Algorithm 1 does not depend on the number of Byzantine processes and our solution to fair exchange in a point-to-point network requires O(n 2 ) messages to reach termination.
RELATED WORK
The web services community has shown only limited interest in providing fair exchange as a central building block, although most researchers and practitioners do acknowledge the importance of fairness in orchestrating commercial web services. Rather, exchange protocols tend to be implemented directly at the application level, on an ad hoc basis, in order to solve some specific variants of fair exchange, e.g., online credit card payment, digital contract signature, certified email delivery, etc. This is for example the case in [26] , where the authors adapt an optimistic exchange protocol of digital signatures [2] , in the context of contract signing between web services. Following a similar idea, the authors of [35] and those of [34] are proposing protocols to support non-repudiable interactions between web services. All the above protocols are however based on a centralized trusted agent, at least at some point of their execution. Hereafter, we thus review more fundamental research efforts, conducted outside the web services community. These efforts aim either at modeling fair exchange or at solving it.
Modeling fair exchange
The fair exchange problem comes basically in two flavors, namely a weak variant and a true variant [31] . Weak fair exchange does not require the exchange to be fair but rather that honest peers are able to gather evidence of potential misbehaviors. This variant thus assumes that misbehaving peers can be brought to justice, which is not the case in our approach. The problem we address in this paper is true fair exchange, which on the contrary requires a strong enforcement of fairness.
Within the realm of true fair exchange, various specifications have been proposed, with slightly different sets of properties [25] . Among these properties, fairness is the most difficult to capture and hence where most specifications tend to differ, as in [2, 5, 29] . Despite what is sometimes claimed, several such specifications are really meaningful for exchanges involving only two processes, i.e., they are impossible to satisfy in models allowing more than one Byzantine process. In [5] for instance, fairness requires that if any correct process does not obtain its item, then no process obtains any items from any other process, which is clearly unsustainable in the presence of two or more Byzantine processes.
11 Note also that many researches explicitly aimed at the fair exchange variant involving only two peers [2, 3, 18, 27, 32] , in particular when it comes to specific applications of fair exchange, e.g., exchanges of digital signatures, of emails and their receipts, etc. Our specification of the fair exchange problem, on the contrary, considers the general case where more than two peers might be involved, and consists in fine-grained properties, each one capturing either a liveness or a safety requirement. In this specification, the integrity and the fairness properties are those really specific to fair exchange, as already discussed in Section 2.1.
Some authors also discuss the difficulty of fair exchange and propose impossibility results in various models. In [29] , fair exchange is measured against consensus, and an impossibility result on fair exchange in asynchronous models is shown by comparison with the FLP impossibility [17] . In [15] , fair exchange is shown to be impossible to solve deterministically in an asynchronous system with no Trusted Third Party (TTP). In another feasibility study [23] , complex exchanges are broken into sub-exchanges -each relying on a different TTP -and represented as a graph. Reduction rules are then applied to the graph in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the exchange. This method also makes it possible to illustrate how closely exchange feasibility relies on trust. Along that line, we have shown that fair exchange is insolvable in a synchronous model in the absence of some identified process that every other process can trust a priori [19] .
Solving fair exchange
Most solutions to fair exchange rely on some kind of Trusted Third Party (TTP). A TTP is a process directly accessible to all processes. Fairness is thus trivially ensured by having processes send their items to the TTP, which forwards the items if the terms of the exchange are fulfilled [9] . A TTP brings synchronism and control over terms of the exchange in order to ensure fairness, but constitutes a bottleneck and a single point of failure. For this reason, various so-called optimistic algorithm have been proposed that only involve the TTP when something goes wrong, i.e., when an attempt to cheat is detected [2, 8, 9, 27] . However optimistic approaches are based on the strong assumption that the environment is mostly honest. To weaken the role of the TTP, in [18] for instance, Franklin and Reiter propose a solution using a semi-trusted third party that can misbehave on its own but does not conspire with either of the two participant peers. Similarly, the authors of [36] propose a solution based on a cluster of untrusted servers acting as third parties. In the latter paper, however, the authors recognize that they are merely solving a variant of the weak fair exchange.
By relying on fully decentralized tamperproof modules, our approach departs from the traditional TTP-based approach and bears similarities with [4, 5, 6] , which also assume embedded tamperproof modules and a similar network topology as the one presented in this paper. If these solutions are similar to ours from the model perspective, they differ in the power given to tamperproof modules: their modules execute a specific algorithm solving either a variant of the consensus problem or of the atomic commitment problem. Our approach on the contrary tries to minimize the role of trusted modules to key steps of our algorithm, which is then executed outside these modules. This feature makes it possible to envision implementations of our secure module in real hardware. Nonetheless, a very interesting feature of the approach proposed in [5] lies in its ability to gracefully degrade its quality of service from deterministic fairness to probabilistic fairness. We are currently investigating how our modular approach could allow for a similar type of graceful service degradation.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a modular and fully decentralized solution to orchestrate fair exchanges in the context of mutually distrustful web services. Based on results of a companion paper [19] , we first presented a model with trusted processes and gave a specification of the fair exchange problem that clearly separates liveness and safety properties. In the context of our network topology, we derived a necessary condition for solving fair exchange, i.e., the honest majority condition. We then described an algorithm that uses two modules: a secure box module, allowing items to be safely retained during the protocol, and a module implementing a protocol solving the well-known Byzantine agreement problem. This solution tries to minimize the necessary role of the secure box. Finally, we proved that, under the honest majority condition, our solution satisfies all properties of fair exchange.
We are currently studying the relationship between our results and those found in the domain of secure multiparty computation and fair computation [20] . We are also investigating how we could modify our algorithm to achieve graceful degradation of its quality of service from deterministic fairness to probabilistic fairness, as in [5] .
